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Abstract
It has been demonstrated that most people have a limited understanding of atmospheric CO2
accumulation. Labeled stock-flow (SF) failure, this phenomenon has even been suggested as an
explanation for weak climate policy support. Drawing on a typology of knowledge, we set out to
nuance previous research by distinguishing between different types of knowledge of CO2
accumulation among the public and by exploring ways of reasoning underlying SF failure. A
mixed methods approach was used and participants (N = 214) were enrolled in an open online
course. We find that ostensibly similar SF tasks show seemingly contradictory results in terms of
people’s understanding of CO2 accumulation. Participants performed significantly better on stock
stabilization tasks that explicitly ask about the relationship between stocks and flows, compared
with a typical SF task that does not direct the participants’ attention to what knowledge they
should use. This suggests that people possess declarative and procedural knowledge of accumu-
lation (knowing about the principles of mass balance, i.e., what and how to use them) but lack
conditional knowledge of accumulation (knowing when to use these principles). Additionally,
through a thematic analysis of answers to an open-ended question, we identified three overarching
ways of reasoning when dealing with SF tasks: system, pattern, and phenomenological reasoning,
providing additional theoretical insights to explain the large difference in performance between
the different SF tasks. These more nuanced perspectives on SF failure can help inform interven-
tions aimed at increasing climate science literacy and point to the need for more detailed
explorations of public knowledge needed to leverage climate policy support.
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1 Introduction
“Carbon in the atmosphere is rising, even as emissions stabilize” was the heading of a recent
article in the New York Times (Gillis 2017). The author was puzzled by this: “If the amount of
the gas that people are putting out has stopped rising, how can the amount that stays in the air
be going up faster than ever?” In fact, each ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted from fossil
fuel combustion increases CO2 concentration in the atmosphere for at least thousands of years
(Archer and Brovkin 2008), meaning that emissions yesterday, today, and tomorrow produce
warming that lasts. Hence, the total amount of CO2 emissions needs to be limited to avoid
dangerous interference with the climate system, with net CO2 emissions eventually coming
down to zero for atmospheric concentrations to stabilize. We are rapidly approaching the
amount of carbon we can emit while staying below 2 °C warming and with current levels of
emissions that carbon budget would be emptied within a few decades (Goodwin et al. 2018;
Peters et al. 2012).
Despite this enormous challenge, the basic relationship between CO2 emissions and
atmospheric CO2 concentrations is poorly understood by the public. The first study demon-
strating the widespread failure to grasp the fundamental relationship between stocks and flows
of CO2 in the carbon cycle—known as stock-flow (SF) failure—was that by Sterman and
Booth Sweeney (2007). In their sample of 212 graduate students at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) within science, technology, engineering, mathematics, or economics, 84%
gave answers to an SF task that violated basic mass-balance principles, assuming atmospheric
carbon stocks would stabilize even if emissions exceeded removals. This is “analogous to
arguing a bathtub filled faster than it drains will never overflow” (ibid. p. 216). The authors
hypothesized that SF failure is due to the use of a pattern matching heuristic, where
respondents match trends in flows and stocks, rather than accounting for the stock-flow
dynamics of the system.
Since the seminal paper by Sterman and Booth Sweeney (2007), several studies have
focused on SF failure, and these can be divided into three main strands of research. First, there
are studies that aim to confirm the findings by Sterman and Booth Sweeney (Cronin et al.
2009; Dutt and Gonzalez 2009). Second, there are studies that alter the tasks or the setting in an
attempt to establish if the poor performance depends on external factors such as task design
and context and background of participants (Cronin and Gonzalez 2007; Sterman and Booth
Sweeney 2002, 2007; Guy et al. 2013; Fischer et al. 2015; Newell et al. 2016). Third, there are
intervention studies that aim to improve understanding among the participants, mainly through
knowledge transfer from other contexts or by active learning methods (Dutt and Gonzalez
2009, 2012a, b; Moxnes and Saysel 2009). A different approach was taken by Dryden et al.
(2018), who simply asked for an estimation of the atmospheric residence time for CO2. Their
results show that people estimate CO2 to be gone from the atmosphere within decades of being
emitted, which further highlights misunderstandings around CO2 accumulation.
In this paper, we report on findings from a mixed methods study of public understanding of
atmospheric CO2 accumulation. First and foremost, we wanted to take a closer look at the
common yet intriguing finding in the literature on SF failure that most people “have difficulty
relating the flows into and out of a stock to the level of the stock, even in simple, familiar contexts
such as bank accounts and bathtubs” (Sterman 2011, p. 817).We surmised that most people have
an intuitive understanding of the concept of accumulation, but this type of understanding is not
revealed in the kind of CO2 stabilization task used by Sterman and Booth Sweeney (2007). We
test this hypothesis by drawing on a typology of knowledge (Biggs 2003) that distinguishes
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between three different types of knowledge that SF tasks can assess: declarative (knowingwhat),
procedural (knowing how), and conditional (knowing when) knowledge.
We note that previous research on SF failure seems to have overlooked this aspect of task
design (there is, at least, no explicit discussion of different types of knowledge). Consequently,
we developed two alternative SF tasks (using the carbon cycle and a bathtub, respectively, as
contexts) with lower knowledge demands,1 so to speak, they explicitly ask about the relation-
ship between the flows into and out of a stock for the stock to stabilize. Performance on these
two alternative SF tasks was compared with performance on a task with higher knowledge
demands, similar to the one used by Sterman and Booth Sweeney (2007). To further test the
surmised disconnection between these types of knowledge, we used a pre- and post-test
design, to investigate whether an explanation of the knowledge required to solve the tasks
would have any effect on the performance on the kind of task used by Sterman and Booth
Sweeney (2007).
In addition, through qualitative data, we sought to gain insight into differentways of reasoning
when solving the SF tasks to better understand what could explain SF failure and why people
seem unable to apply intuitive knowledge about accumulation in certain tasks. It is widely
acknowledged that an understanding of how people make sense of concepts and principles in
science is essential for effective science teaching and communication (Ambrose et al. 2010;
Morgan et al. 2002). Yet, most previous research on SF failure has focused on task performance
without probing how people actually reasonwhen solving various SF tasks (Korzilius et al. 2014).
One notable exception is the study by Korzilius et al. (2014), which used the think-aloud method
to explore “reasoning patterns” used by people when solving SF tasks. The SF tasks in their study,
however, were more generic, while our study focuses on ways of reasoning about atmospheric
CO2 accumulation and how this relates to task performance. There are several reasons for the
necessity of studying ways of reasoning in the CO2 context, ranging from the carbon cycle
dynamics (which posit that the capacity for uptake of CO2 is determined by the historical
emissions) to the amount of public debate on the topic. As an example, the New York Times
article mentioned earlier received more than 600 comments online.
Finally, we investigated whether there is a connection between performance on our
SF tasks and stated climate policy support, as suggested by some (Sterman 2008; Chen
2011; Dutt and Gonzalez 2012a). While there is some support for the notion that
climate science literacy enhances concern for climate change (Hornsey et al. 2016;
Guy et al. 2014; Ranney and Clark 2016), the previous literature on SF failure in the
climate context has not explicitly tested for a relationship between SF task performance
and stated climate policy support.
2 Method
2.1 Study context and participants
The context of the study was a massive open online course (MOOC) entitled “Sustain-
ability in Everyday Life,”2 offered by Chalmers University of Technology between
Aug 29, 2016, and Oct 16, 2016, using the EdX platform. The course was not part of
1 The knowledge demands of a task refer to the cognitive resources needed to solve the task.
2 ChalmersX, ChM002x is the edx.org course code
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any university program, required no particular prior knowledge, was open to take, and free
of charge for everyone with internet access. It only generated a diploma if completed. This
MOOC was chosen for this study due to the relevant course content and the possibility to
get a large number of respondents.
The sustainability MOOC consisted of five modules or themes: globalization, cli-
mate, food, energy, and chemicals. The performance on different kinds of SF tasks was
assessed during the climate module, directly after a general introductory video on
climate change, which did not address the knowledge tested by the SF tasks, and a
question assessing climate policy support was included in the pre-course survey (i.e.,
before the students were introduced to any course contents). To motivate task comple-
tion, the SF tasks gave points that contributed to the total examination of the course
regardless of performance.
Of 3540 participants enrolled in the course, 300 started the climate change module
where the SF tasks were placed. Of these, 214 participated in the study by completing
all of the SF tasks. A total of 49 countries were represented in the sample, with most
participants from the EU/EEA (58), the USA (25), India (11), and Mexico (9). See the
supplementary material for the full list. The sample included 119 females and 77 males
(18 participants had not disclosed their gender). The participants’ average age was
38 years. Of the 92% who stated their highest attained educational level, 81% had a
bachelor’s degree or higher. Admittedly, the high average education level, together with
the fact that the participants have opted to take a course in sustainability, implies that
our participants do not constitute a representative sample of the general public (see the
supplementary material for more information on the course context and participants).
2.2 Study design
In this section, the overall design of the study is described along with the design of the tasks; in
the next section we explain—by drawing on a typology of knowledge—how tasks were
designed to assess different types of knowledge. Table 1 depicts the overall design of the
study, summarizing the different tasks (all tasks were completed online) and the order in which
they were completed—the five steps of the study design.
Prior to the SF tasks, the participants were given a question aiming to measure stated
preferences with respect to climate policy (T0). Here, the participants were asked which one of
the following statements came closest to their personal view:
1. Society should not take any steps to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (such as CO2).
2. Society should reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the future, in response to climate
impacts as they actually occur.
3. Society should take moderate actions to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases today, to
reduce future climate impacts.
4. Society should take strong action to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases today, to
reduce future climate impacts.
5. I do not know/I have not formed an opinion.
The alternatives were formulated to reflect attitudes of “wait and see” (2) or “go slow” (3), as
discussed by Sterman (2008).
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In the first SF task (T1), participants completed a task, which we will refer to as the main SF
task that was designed to be similar to the task used by Sterman andBooth Sweeney (2007).3 The
main SF task consists of a short introductory text, graphs of the annual historic emissions and
uptake of CO2, a graph of a scenario with a stabilized amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, and a
multiple choice question (see Fig. 1). Participants were asked to choose, among four alternative
graphs, the graph depicting emissions and uptake trajectories that is consistent with the scenario
for CO2 stabilization. The correct answer is alternative 3 (marked with a green symbol).
Although the main SF task (see Fig. 1) was designed to be similar to the task used by
Sterman and Booth Sweeney (2007), our version of the task contained less superfluous
information, both in text and graphs, to avoid cognitive overload. However, we added more
elaborate information about the CO2 uptake, which was given the same attention as the
emissions. For the first period of the graphs (i.e., 1900–2015), the CO2 emissions and uptake
values were produced using a simple climate model (Sterner and Johansson 2017), which
simulates the carbon cycle response. For this, widely used “historic emissions” that give a
realistic impression were used (Meinshausen et al. 2011).
No feedback on task performance is provided to the participants throughout the full set of
tasks. In the second SF task (T2), participants were randomly assigned to complete one of three
alternative tasks, T2A–C (see Table 1). In contrast to the main SF task, these tasks were
designed to direct the participants’ attention towards the principles of accumulation. This was
done by explicitly asking questions about (T2A–B) or describing (T2C) the relationship
between the flows into and out of a stock in order for the stock to stabilize at a certain level.
As a consequence, and as we argue in the next section, these tasks differ from the main SF task
in terms of their knowledge demands—that is, in terms of the type of knowledge they assess.
The first task (T2A) uses the carbon cycle as context (see Fig. 2), while the second (T2B) uses
a bathtub as context (see Fig. 3). These two tasks are central to our hypothesis (stated in the
introduction) as they allow us to investigate whether participants perform better on stock
stabilization tasks that explicitly ask about the relationship between the flows into and out of a
stock (T2A–B), compared with the kind of task used in previous studies (Dutt and Gonzalez
2012a; Guy et al. 2013; Newell et al. 2016; Sterman and Booth Sweeney 2007) (T1). The third
task (T2C), not involving a question, uses a bathtub analogy to explain atmospheric CO2
accumulation in a simple way (see figure in the supplementary material); in T2C, the
respondents were only asked to confirm that they had studied the analogy. This task, in
3 Sterman and Booth Sweeney (2007) used a text from the summary for policymakers in the IPCC’s Third
Assessment Report (Houghton et al. 2001).
Table 1 An overview of the study design, describing the tasks’ order and format, the types of knowledge
assessed, and the number of participants that completed each task
Task N Task format Knowledge assessed
T0: climate policy task 167 Multiple choice (text) n.a.
T1: main task 214 Multiple choice (graph) Declarative, procedural, and conditional
(higher knowledge demand)
T2: alternative task
(intervention)
A: 74
B: 77
A and B: multiple choice (text) A and B: declarative and procedural
(lower knowledge demand)
C: 63 C: reading explanatory text C: n.a.
T3: main task repeated
(post-test)
214 Multiple choice (graph) Declarative, procedural, and conditional
(higher knowledge demand)
T4: reasoning about T3 204 Open ended n.a.
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Figure I. Historical CO2 emissions (red) and uptake (blue) in billion tons of CO2 per year.
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Task 1
The amount of CO2 in the atmosphere is aﬀected by two ﬂows of CO2, one into the atmosphere 
(emissions) and one out of the atmosphere (uptake). CO2 emissions are mainly caused by the 
burning of fossil fuels and lead to an increase in the amounts of CO2 in the atmosphere. CO2 is 
taken up by forests and oceans, causing a decrease in the amounts of CO2 in the atmosphere. In 
the last century, emissions of CO2 have exceeded uptake and the amount of CO2 in the 
atmosphere have increased. Figure I shows historical levels of CO2 emissions and esmated 
levels of CO2 uptake unl year 2015. Current levels of emissions are about 36 billion tons of CO2
per year and uptake is about 18 billion tons of CO2 per year. 
Figure II shows historical amounts of CO2 in the atmosphere unl 2015 followed by a scenario of 
future amounts of CO2 in the atmosphere. In this CO2 scenario the amount of CO2 in the 
atmosphere gradually rises and stabilizes at a level about 10 % higher than today in the year 
2050, as shown in Figure II. 
What would the levels of emissions and uptake look like for the rest of this century in order for 
the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere to follow the scenario in Figure II? 
Provide your answer by selecng one of the alternaves A-E with curves represenng the 
emissions and the uptake, respecvely, for the period 2015-2100.
Figure II. Amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, historically up to today followed by a scenario of the 
future amounts of CO2 in the atmosphere.
1) 2)
3) 4)
Correct 
Answer
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contrast to T2A–B, presented the participants with the knowledge that is needed to solve the
main SF task.
Thereafter, the participants were asked to complete the main SF task again (T3) (see Table 1
and Fig. 1). The logic behind this was that the alternative tasks, T2A–C, would help
participants by pointing to the knowledge needed for solving the main SF task, thus allowing
us to investigate whether these three tasks could serve as educational interventions that
improve performance on the main SF task.
In addition to testing people’s performance on SF tasks with different knowledge demands,
we aim to unpack public understanding of CO2 accumulation by exploring people’s ways of
reasoning when solving SF tasks. We did this by, in task T4, asking participants to provide a
short, written explanation of how they reasoned when choosing to keep or change their answer
when completing the main SF task again (T3). Collecting the combined data of how people
answer on SF tasks and how they reason while doing so, we aim to study the mental
representations used by the participants when answering the main SF task. Mental represen-
tations are similar to mental models (which are “personal, internal representations of external
reality that people use to interact with the world around them”) (Jones et al. 2011) but are here
used instead of mental models to emphasize that their nature is not seen to be stable or static to
the same extent that mental models are sometimes viewed.
2.3 Task design and knowledge demands
As noted above, the tasks—the main SF task (T1/T3) and the alternative tasks (T2A–B)—were
designed to assess different types of knowledge. While knowledge can be classified in many
ways (Alexander et al. 1991), we draw on a typology described by (among others) Biggs
(2003), comprising three types of knowledge:
1. Declarative knowledge, which refers to “knowing about things [such as facts, concepts,
and principles], or knowing what” (p. 41)
2. Procedural knowledge, which refers to “knowing how to do things, such as carrying out
procedures or enacting skills” (p. 42)4
3. Conditional knowledge, which refers to “knowing when to do these things [...] under what
conditions one should do this as opposed to that” (p. 42)
These types of knowledge are “characterized by the function they fulfil in the performance of a
target task” (de Jong and Ferguson-Hessler 1996, p. 106). To put it differently, we are
interested in knowledge-in-use (ibid. p. 110).5 Moreover, while “it is certainly possible to
Fig. 1 The main SF task (T1/T3), which also included an answer alternative 5: “I don’t know.” The correct
answer is alternative 3 in which emissions and uptake meet—which causes the atmospheric CO2 amount to
stabilize—after which they jointly diminish over time (since lower emissions causes uptake to fall)
4 It is worth noting that this definition of procedural knowledge, also endorsed by others (e.g., Alexander et al.
1991; de Jong and Ferguson-Hessler 1996), does not restrict procedural knowledge to being tacit—in contrast to
some definitions, primarily in other scientific domains include both tacit and explicit knowledge.
5 This theoretical stance—and the three-part typology of knowledge described here—is perhaps best understood
in light of the long-standing criticism leveled at university teaching for placing too much emphasis on declarative
knowledge (Biggs 2003), or even procedural knowledge (Turns and Van Meter 2011). We join Turns and Van
Meter (2011) in arguing that one way of mitigating this problem is by anchoring teaching (and educational
research) in the typology of knowledge described here.
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know the what of a thing without knowing the how or when of it” (Alexander et al. 1991, p.
323), successful problem solving requires the use of all three of these types of knowledge
(Turns and Van Meter 2011). With these theoretical deliberations in mind, we now turn to an
epistemological demand analysis (de Jong and Ferguson-Hessler 1996)—i.e., an analysis of
the knowledge demands—of our SF tasks.
Tasks T2A (climate context) and T2B (bathtub context) were designed to assess
declarative and procedural knowledge of accumulation. That is, in these tasks, partic-
ipants first have to recall what the principles of accumulation (i.e., principles of mass
balance) say—thus demonstrating declarative knowledge. Next, they have to figure out
how to apply these principles to arrive at the relationship between the emissions/inflow
and uptake/outflow for the amount of CO2 or water to stabilize at a certain level—thus
demonstrating procedural knowledge.6 The difference between T2A and T2B is mainly
the familiarity of the context, where the more familiar context of a bathtub may make it
easier to draw on knowledge that is relevant for solving the problem.
In the main SF task (T1/T3), on the other hand, participants not only have to apply
the principles of accumulation—thus demonstrating declarative and procedural knowl-
edge (as in T2A–B)—but also have to realize that this is what the task requires them to
do—thus demonstrating conditional knowledge. Note that the main SF task does not
direct the participants’ attention towards the principles of accumulation; that is, it does
not explicitly ask about the relationship between the emissions and uptake for the
amount of CO2 to stabilize. As such, one can argue that the main SF task (T1/T3)
poses higher demands on knowledge, compared with tasks T2A–B.
2.4 Data analysis
In addition to descriptive statistics, a chi-square test of homogeneity was used to determine if
the rate of success was significantly different between any pair of groups on the same task or
any pair of tasks for the same group.
An inductive thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006) was used to analyze the partici-
pants’ written answers to the open-ended question, “Briefly explain how you reasoned when
choosing to keep or change your answer.” In line with this kind of qualitative analysis, a set of
themes was identified after coding the data and sorting and sifting the codes in an iterative way.
(For a more detailed account of the analysis, see the supplementary material.) These themes
provided a deeper understanding of the ways of reasoning being used when answering the
main SF task and made it possible to relate the performance on the different SF tasks to
different ways of reasoning.
3 Results
3.1 Performance on SF tasks with different knowledge demands
Table 2 shows that there was a large difference between participants’ performance on the SF
tasks that assessed different types of knowledge and SF tasks with different knowledge
6 That is, they have to carry out the following calculation (procedure): A
: ¼ 0→E ¼ U , where A stands for the
amount of CO2 or water, E for emissions/inflow, and U for uptake/outflow.
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demands. The main SF task—both as a pre-test and post-test—had a significantly lower
success rate than the two alternative tasks, T2A (carbon cycle context) and T2B (bathtub
context), that directed the participants’ attention towards the principles of accumulation and
hence did not assess conditional knowledge. The success rate for the participants who were
assigned T2Awent from 26 on the main SF task to 54% on the alternative task. For the T2B
group, the success rate increased from 17 to 70%. These differences are statistically significant
(p < 0.001) and indicate a high level of intuitive understanding—declarative and procedural
knowledge—of the principles of accumulation. The level of education also seems to be
Task 2A (T2A) 
Consider the emission and uptake seng in Figure I [see Figure 1]. 
What is required of the relaonship between the emissions and uptake of CO2, in order for the 
amount of CO2 in the atmosphere to stop increasing and stabilize at a certain level in the future?
Provide your answer by selecng one of the alternaves A-E.
A – Emissions and uptake should connue growing but keep their current diﬀerence
B - Emissions and uptake should stop growing and keep their current diﬀerence 
C - Emissions should reduce to and stay equal to the uptake
D - Emissions should reduce to and stay at a level below the uptake
E - I don't know
Fig. 2 A description of task T2A, directing participants’ attention towards the principles of accumulation in the
original carbon cycle context. T2Awas designed to have a lower knowledge demand compared with the main SF
task: it (only) assesses declarative and procedural knowledge of accumulation
Figure Tub.  Illustrave ﬁgure and graph of a bathtub with inﬂow (solid red line) and oulow (solid 
blue line) in liter/min.
Task 2B (T2B)
Consider the inﬂow and oulow seng in Figure Tub. 
What is required of the relaonship between the inﬂow and oulow of water, in order for the 
amount of water in the bathtub to stop increasing and stabilize at a certain level?
Provide your answer by selecng one of the alternaves A-E.
A – Inﬂow and oulow should connue growing but keep their current diﬀerence
B - Inﬂow and oulow should stop growing and keep their current diﬀerence 
C - Inﬂow should reduce to and stay equal to the oulow
D - Inﬂow should reduce to and stay at a level below the oulow
E - I don't know
Fig. 3 A description of task T2B, directing participants’ attention towards the principles of accumulation in a
bathtub context. T2B was (like T2A) designed to have a lower knowledge demand compared with the main SF
task: it (only) assesses declarative and procedural knowledge of accumulation
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positively correlated with performance (see the supplementary material) but was not analyzed
further because it is outside the scope of this study.
3.2 Efficacy of the interventions
For the full sample, the success rate on the main SF task was 21% in T1 and 28% in T3, after
the alternative tasks, serving as interventions (see Table 2). This difference is not statistically
significant (p = 0.14). Only one of the three interventions had a weakly statistically significant
(p = 0.08) impact on the participants’ performance on the main SF task: the alternative task that
directed the participants’ attention towards the principles of accumulation in the bathtub
context (T2B). The task (T2C) that involved reading about the bathtub as an analogy for
atmospheric CO2 accumulation (see the supplementary material) did not improve the partic-
ipants’ success rate on the main SF task, even though it presented them with the knowledge
needed to answer the task, using both text and visuals.
3.3 Ways of reasoning
Five different ways of reasoning when answering the SF tasks (from answers on task T4) were
identified, and these could be grouped into three main categories: system reasoning (with three
subcategories), pattern reasoning, and phenomenological reasoning. These reflect different
mental representations of the tasks (and possibly different levels of ambition in dealing with
the tasks). Below, we describe what the participants focused on when using a certain way of
reasoning, with Table 3 showing the frequency of responses that were classified to belong to the
different categories of reasoning and some illustrative quotes for the different ways of reasoning.
Participants who used system reasoning focused on the system in terms of a relationship
between emissions and uptake. We identified three different ways of conceptualizing this
relationship:
1. Conservation of mass, which correctly posits that emissions must equal uptake for CO2
stabilization
2. No accumulation, which incorrectly posits that the difference between emissions and
uptake must be constant for CO2 stabilization. Some participants claimed that the amount
of CO2 in the atmosphere is equal to the annual difference between emissions and uptake
(i.e., A = E−U). Consequently, this way of reasoning does not take into account the
amount of CO2 in the atmosphere at the start of each year that remains from past years
Table 2 Share of correct answers for SF tasks and a chi-square test of homogeneity, in which statistically
significant (p < 0.1) differences are marked in italics
Task group (N) Share of correct answers Chi-square homogeneity test (p values)
Main task,
pre-test (T1)
Alternative
task (T2)
Main task,
post-test (T3)
T1–T2 T2–T3 T1–T3
Full sample (214) 21% 62%* 28% 3E−15 4E−11 0.14
A: CO2 question (74) 26% 54% 24% 4E−04 0.0002 0.85
B: bathtub question (77) 17% 70% 29% 3E−11 2E−07 0.08
C: bathtub description (63) 22% – 30% – – 0.31
*This is the average success rate for the alternative tasks T2A and T2B together
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3. Historic debt balancing, which incorrectly posits that emissions must go below uptake for
CO2 stabilization. According to this way of reasoning, emissions have historically been
above uptake and all emitted CO2 needs to be taken up for CO2 stabilization (i.e., A
: ¼ 0
only if ∫(E) = ∫ (U))
Participants who used pattern reasoning inappropriately focused on matching graphical
patterns between the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere and the annual emissions or uptake.
Alternatively, they focused on the notion of “stabilization,” without being explicit about in
what sense.
Participants who used phenomenological reasoning focused on a variety of aspects of
phenomena related to climate change that are not needed for solving the SF tasks.7
Examples of such phenomena can be found in the illustrative quotes for this way of
reasoning in Table 3 but include population growth and sources of emissions and uptake.
Based on these phenomena related to climate change, participants seemingly or explicitly
inferred what will or should happen to emissions and uptake in the future, rather than
dealing with the task as it is formulated.
3.4 Relation between ways of reasoning and answers on the main SF task
Figure 4 shows how the five ways of reasoning, identified from the answers on task T4, are
related to answers on the main SF task in the post-test (T3). While some of the participants
who chose the first or second (incorrect) alternatives of increasing or stable emission scenarios
reasoned in terms of no accumulation, the majority of those who chose the second alternative
used pattern reasoning. The vast majority of those who chose the third (correct) alternative
used conservation of mass. The majority of those who chose the fourth (incorrect) alternative,
where emissions plummet below uptake, reasoned in terms of historic debt balancing. In
summary, Fig. 4 shows that apart from phenomenological reasoning—which appears in all
four alternative answers—there is a dominant way of reasoning behind each alternative. The
occurrence of phenomenological reasoning in all alternative answers in the post-test suggests
that the participants struggled to create a correct mental representation of the main SF task; that
is, they struggled to judge what prior knowledge is relevant for the SF task at hand.
We note that among those who managed to create or utilize a mental representation that
guided them to the correct answer, only a couple used phenomenological reasoning. The
largest shares of unclassified explanations fell into the first two answer alternatives which also
had the largest shares of pattern matchers. This may indicate that an unproportionally large
share of the answers for alternatives 1 and 2 is less thought through than the average answer,
since the main reason for not being classified was that explanations given were too brief to be
classifiable (which we reason is a sign of the tasks being given little thought) and since pattern
matching is considered to be a general solution heuristic (Gilovich and Savitsky 2002)
requiring little cognitive effort.
Lastly, we note that among those answering alternative 4 (in which emissions go below
uptake), a higher than average number of participants were categorized into more than one way
of reasoning. Most often they reasoned both about what they want to happen or what needs to
7 In keeping with a common use of the term (e.g., Redish 2003), we use the term phenomenological here to
reflect the numerous references to the “real world” in this category, as opposed to the more abstract and
mathematically oriented discourse in the other categories.
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happen in terms of human development (as opposed to in terms of emissions, uptake, and
amount)—i.e., phenomenological reasoning—and about the need for emissions to go below
uptake for the amount to stabilize—historic debt balancing.
Table 3 The participants’ answers to the open-ended task (T4) were classified into five ways of reasoning, which
are summarized into three overarching categories. The frequencies reported are the fraction of the 214 answers
that were classified to belong to a given category or way of reasoning. These do not sum up to 100% since some
answers were classified as belonging to several ways of reasoning. The ways of reasoning are exemplified using
illustrative quotes
Category/subcategory Frequency Illustrative quotes
System reasoning 44%*
Conservation of mass 23% “In order to get a concentration of CO2 stable, we want a net flow = 0,
thus we want uptake = emission.”
“For the amount to stabilise, input and outflow have to have the same
value. The only graph showing this is the third one.
The absolute values are irrelevant. The trend could
as well be positive, providing the lines for input and
outflow are coincident.”
No accumulation 7.5% “The amount CO2 in the atmosphere is dependent on inflow minus
outflow. In order to stabilize the total, you need to stabilize this
difference, as seen in [alternatives] 1 and 2.”
Historic debt balancing 7.5% “The historical CO2 emission shows that the difference between intake
and uptake has been increasing and is getting bigger over the years.
This means that in order for the level to stabilize, the intake needs to
make up for all of these past bigger increases and that can only
happen if over the coming years intake is inferior to uptake.”
Pattern reasoning 26% “The leveling off in [alternative] 2 seems to match the graph in my
answer.”
“If CO2 stabilizes then everything stabilizes.”
Phenomenological
reasoning
17% “The emissions levels will keep rising on our current course and uptake
will stay the same because of deforestation and population growth.”
“My reasoning is based on the premise that at the early stages of human
existence, there was less population and less pressure on the
environment because early humans were basically hunter gatherers
who moved from one place to another and depended less on the
environment. As the population increases there became an immediate
need to sustained the growing population, accompanied by industrial
revolution with increasing technology. All these resulted to a
systematic increase in emission of Carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere because the forest is systematically exploited, creating a
scenario where the emission of carbon dioxide far exceed the
absorptive capacity. Maintaining the emission capacity from now
until the end of the century means that exploitation of natural
resources that emits carbon dioxide will systematically be reduced,
and at the same time maintain the absorptive capacity of carbon
dioxide.”
Not categorized 24%
*Includes a 6% that cannot be placed into either of the three subcategories
60 Climatic Change (2019) 154:49–67
3.5 Relation between performance on SF tasks and stated climate policy support
The stated support for stringent climate policies was very strong in our sample (see the
supplementary material), with 93% of the 167 participants that answered both the SF tasks
and the climate policy question agreeing with the statement that “society should take strong
action to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases today.” This clearly shows that our sample
participants constitute an interested and pro-climate policy group of the general public. Given
this lack of variance in stated climate policy support, we were unable to explore potential
correlations between different types of knowledge (or understanding) of climate physics and
stated policy support. However, these results suggest that at least the type of knowledge tested
in the main SF task is not a prerequisite for stated support for stringent climate policy.
4 Discussion
4.1 Probing SF failure: knowing how and knowing when
Interestingly, but in line with our hypothesis that SF tasks with lower knowledge demands
would result in higher success rates, participants performed significantly better on the SF
tasks that directed their attention towards the principles of accumulation (T2A–B), com-
pared with the main SF task (T1/T3). As Newell et al. (2013) pointed out, “Given the low-
base of accurate performance in [SF tasks], any manipulation which leads to over 50% of
the sample getting the answer (approximately) correct is newsworthy” (p. 3143). Our
finding nuances the common finding in the literature on SF failure that most people “have
difficulty relating the flows into and out of a stock to the level of the stock, even in simple,
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familiar contexts such as bank accounts and bathtubs” (Sterman 2011, p. 817). Instead, we
found that most participants were able to successfully solve SF tasks (T2A–B) assessing
declarative and procedural knowledge of accumulation (knowing what and knowing how)
but struggled with conditional knowledge (knowing when) in relation to the main SF task.
To put it in simpler terms, our finding suggests that people do “understand” the principles
of accumulation and how to use them but do not understand that it is this knowledge they
should apply in the main SF task. This finding is in line with research on problem solving
in physics, indicating that students find it difficult to create a correct mental representation
of a new problem by combining the information provided in the problem statement with
relevant background knowledge (Savelsbergh et al. 2002).
Yet, the idea that different kinds of SF tasks may assess different types of knowledge of
accumulation seems to be largely overlooked in the literature on SF failure; there is, at least, no
explicit discussion of different types of knowledge or what it means to “understand” accumu-
lation. Indeed, we note that the high success rates on several SF tasks reported by Fischer et al.
(2015) could be a result of what type of knowledge they assess, rather than the particular
format (without graphs), as suggested by the authors.
4.2 Efficacy of the interventions
Only one of the three alternative tasks that directed the participants’ attention towards the
principles of accumulation had a (weakly) statistically significant impact on performance
on the main SF task in the post-test: the alternative task that used the bathtub analogy as
context (T2B). This finding supports the notion that while analogies can be an effective
teaching tool (Podolefsky and Finkelstein 2006), active learning methods, such as an-
swering a question, are more conducive to learning compared with just reading or hearing
an explanation (Freeman et al. 2014). However, the rather small improvement in the
success rate for the main SF task suggests that additional scaffolding is needed to
overcome the challenges inherent in the main SF task.
4.3 Ways of reasoning provide additional theoretical insights into SF failure
We identified five ways of reasoning when dealing with the main SF task, and these could be
grouped into three categories: system reasoning, pattern reasoning, and phenomenological
reasoning. These ways of reasoning provide additional theoretical insights to explain the large
difference in performance between the different kinds of SF tasks. More specifically, they
provide insights into what background knowledge participants drew on to create a mental
representation of the main SF task. Our results therefore support the interesting hypothesis that
SF failure “may be less a matter of incorrect knowledge and more a matter of incorrect
problem representation” (Cronin and Gonzalez 2007, p. 15).
System reasoning consists of three subcategories, which we have termed conservation of
mass, no accumulation, and historic debt balancing. The “no accumulation” subcategory
supports the claim made by Cronin and Gonzalez (2007, p. 11) that some people “will look
at the difference between the inflow and outflow when thinking about the stock […], but they
will ignore current accumulation in the stock”.
Pattern reasoning involves using the correlation heuristic as a problem solving strat-
egy, “erroneously assuming that the behavior of a stock matches the pattern of its flows”
(Cronin et al. 2009, p. 1). While the correlation heuristic has been forwarded as the
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dominant reason for SF failure (Cronin et al. 2009), it remained an untested hypothesis
until recently. As Korzilius et al. (2014) noted:
Thus far, research on stock-flow performance has focused on the outcomes of reasoning
processes and inferred that individuals use correlational reasoning while estimating
stock-flow behavior, assuming that the flow(s) immediately and directly affect the stock.
The actual reasoning process of participants remained hidden from the researchers. […]
We may say that the correlation heuristic has the status of a hypothetical idea, a
presumption that still has to be tested in research (p. 269).
Our study provides empirical evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, for the claim that
people use the correlation heuristic as a problem solving strategy. In the main SF task, the
answer alternative that was selected by most participants (about 45%) was the pattern
matching alternative, and pattern reasoning was the most frequently used explanation for
choosing this alternative. This finding is in line with previous research, demonstrating a
strong tendency for pattern matching (e.g., Dutt and Gonzalez 2013; Reichert et al. 2015;
Cronin et al. 2009; Sterman 2008).
To our knowledge, phenomenological reasoning has not been documented in the literature
on SF failure. What distinguishes phenomenological reasoning from the other types of
reasoning is a strong focus on the context of the SF task and various phenomena related to
climate change. Previous research on SF failure has viewed contextual knowledge as some-
thing that might be lacking and hence a potential explanation for the poor performance on SF
tasks (Cronin et al. 2009; Newell et al. 2013). Interestingly, in our study, the problem was
rather the opposite: It is not that participants knew “too little” about the context—it is rather
that they knew “too much” and got “lost in the complexity of the context,” to borrow a phrase
from Eggert et al. (2017). The crux of phenomenological reasoning is echoed in an observation
made by the Spanish novelist Pérez-Reverte (1998):
There are no innocent readers anymore. Each overlays the text with his own perverse
view. A reader is the total of all he’s read, in addition to all the films and television he’s
seen. To the information supplied by the author he’ll always add his own. And that’s
where the danger lies: An excess of references (p. 335).
By unearthing several such “references” and putting phenomenological reasoning next to the
other ways of reasoning, we provide novel insights into climate change domain-specific
challenges related to solving the kind of SF task used by Sterman and Booth Sweeney (2007).
Our findings have important implications for teaching and climate change communication.
First of all, it is unlikely that a single learning activity or explanation will help all people—with
their different ways of reasoning—to understand atmospheric CO2 accumulation. People using no
accumulation reasoning need help to realize that the CO2 that was present last year does not
magically disappear, so to speak. Those using historic debt balancing would likely benefit from
being reminded that we are opting for stabilizing the CO2 amount at a higher level (comparedwith
pre-industrial times) and that if all CO2 emitted by humans (since industrialization) were taken up,
we would fall back to pre-industrial atmospheric CO2 levels. People using phenomenological
reasoning, and potentially also those using pattern matching, would likely benefit from having a
guided step-by-step comparison of the carbon cycle with a carefully chosen analogical system.
This could help them focus on the principles of accumulation. Having been told or reminded of
how the principles work in a contained and familiar analogical context, the learners should have a
Climatic Change (2019) 154:49–67 63
chance to follow an assisted transfer of knowledge back to the CO2 context. This may help them
realize how the principles are applicable in the climate context which by itself may previously
have caused them to lose track of their reasoning around accumulation.
A limitation of the thematic analysis presented here was the briefness of the answers
provided by most participants to the open-ended question. Thus, a next step could be to
conduct semi-structured interviews with a smaller sample to explore in more detail what
conceptual and mathematical difficulties people experience when dealing with SF tasks that
assess different types of knowledge. Investigating deeper psychological mechanisms behind
the different ways of reasoning identified in this study is also a possible next step. The
substantial fraction of answers which included people’s attitudes about what they want to
see happen suggests that how people answer and reason is affected by more than mere task-
specific cognitive reasoning. A large fraction of the participants seems to have uncon-
sciously substituted the cognitively demanding SF task with a simpler question and
answered that question instead—what Kahneman and Frederick (2002) call attribute
substitution. We hypothesize that attribute substitution may explain why people tend
to use pattern reasoning and phenomenological reasoning, and thus an inappropriate
mental representation of the SF tasks.
4.4 Link between knowledge and stated policy support
Our results clearly demonstrate that performing well on the main SF task is not a necessary
condition for stated support for climate policy. This should perhaps come as no surprise, given
the extensive evidence that there is a host of other factors, beyond knowledge, that influence
people’s attitude and behavior in relation to climate change mitigation and adaptation, such as
values, social norms, science skepticism and literacy, and political orientation (Hornsey et al.
2016; Hamilton et al. 2015; Gifford 2011; Wibeck 2014).
On the other hand, in no way do our results rule out that a better understanding of (some
aspects of) climate science could affect support for climate policy or that understanding could be
important for actual (or revealed) climate policy support. The existing evidence on the connec-
tions between climate science literacy and climate policy support does show that greater
understanding of climate science correlates with greater belief in or acceptance of climate change
(Hornsey et al. 2016; Guy et al. 2014; Ranney and Clark 2016) and that greater belief in turn is
associated with stronger support for climate policy (Hornsey et al. 2016), though the latter effect
is relatively small. Hence, we agree with Eggert et al. (2017) who argue that conceptual
understanding of climate physics “is an important prerequisite to change individuals’ attitudes
towards climate change and thus to eventually foster climate literate citizens” (p. 137).
A key question—related to the main focus of this study—is what (type of) knowledge has
the largest potential to leverage climate policy support. For instance, the Climate Literacy
Framework presented by the US Global Change Research Program lists no less than 39 points
that climate literate citizens should know in order to make informed decisions on climate
change; a better understanding of which of these points are more important for fostering
support for climate policies would help promote more effective climate change communica-
tion. The results presented by Shi et al. (2016) show that there can be differences in how
knowledge in different domains of climate science—such as basic physics, causes, and
impacts—can affect attitudes to climate risks. However, this and other studies on the links
between climate literacy and concerns have solely focused on different facets of declarative
knowledge (i.e., climate science facts). The results presented in this study suggest that it would
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also be interesting to further explore the relationship between other types of knowledge
(procedural and conditional) and climate policy support.
5 Conclusions
The question of whether people understand atmospheric CO2 accumulation is not as simple as
it seems. This mixed methods study of public understanding of atmospheric CO2 accumulation
and stated climate policy support extends previous research on SF failure by showing that:
& Seemingly similar SF tasks may assess different types of knowledge, and people perform
significantly better on tasks assessing declarative and procedural knowledge compared
with tasks assessing conditional knowledge
& When faced with a climate SF task, most people use one of three overarching ways of
reasoning: system reasoning, pattern reasoning, and phenomenological reasoning
& System reasoning took on three different forms which we name conservation of mass, no
accumulation, and historic debt balancing. These three different ways of reasoning suggest
that the system was treated using three distinctly different mental representations
Taken together, our findings show that SF failure can be due to the use of inappropriate mental
representations of SF tasks rather than a poor understanding of the principles of accumulation.
This calls for both a more nuanced discussion on how to promote understanding of climate
science and a more detailed exploration of the links between different (types) of climate
science knowledge and climate policy support.
Acknowledgments The authors wish to thank Matthew A. Cronin and an anonymous reviewer for valuable
feedback on the manuscript.
Funding information Funding from the Swedish Energy Agency, Adlerbertska, and Chalmers University of
Technology undergraduate education is gratefully acknowledged.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Alexander PA, Schallert DL, Hare VC (1991) Coming to terms: how researchers in learning and literacy talk
about knowledge. Rev Educ Res 61:315–343
Ambrose SA, Bridges MW, DiPietro M, Lovett MC, Norman MK (2010) How learning works: seven research-
based principles for smart teaching. Wiley
Archer D, Brovkin V (2008) The millennial atmospheric lifetime of anthropogenic CO2. Clim Chang 90:283–297
Biggs JB (2003) Teaching for quality learning at university: what the student does. McGraw-hill education (UK)
Braun V, Clarke V (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qual Res Psychol 3:77–101
Chen X (2011) Why do people misunderstand climate change? Heuristics, mental models and ontological
assumptions. Clim Chang 108:31–46
Cronin MA, Gonzalez C (2007) Understanding the building blocks of dynamic systems. Syst Dyn Rev 23:1–17
Cronin MA, Gonzalez C, Sterman JD (2009) Why don’t well-educated adults understand accumulation? A
challenge to researchers, educators, and citizens. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 108:116–130
Climatic Change (2019) 154:49–67 65
de Jong T, Ferguson-Hessler MG (1996) Types and qualities of knowledge. Educ Psychol 31:105–113
Dryden R, Morgan MG, Bostrom A, de BWB (2018) Public perceptions of how long air pollution and carbon
dioxide remain in the atmosphere. Risk Anal 38:525–534
Dutt V, Gonzalez C (2009) Human “mis”-perceptions of climate change. In: Proceedings of the human factors
and ergonomics society annual meeting. SAGE Publications, pp 384–388
Dutt V, Gonzalez C (2012a) Decisions from experience reduce misconceptions about climate change. J Environ
Psychol 32:19–29
Dutt V, Gonzalez C (2012b) Human control of climate change. Clim Chang 111:497–518
Dutt V, Gonzalez C (2013) Reducing the linear perception of nonlinearity: use of a physical representation. J
Behav Decis Mak 26:51–67
Eggert S, Nitsch A, Boone WJ, Nückles M, Bögeholz S (2017) Supporting students’ learning and socioscientific
reasoning about climate change—the effect of computer-based concept mapping scaffolds. Res Sci Educ
47(1):137–159
Fischer H, Degen C, Funke J (2015) Improving stock-flow reasoning with verbal formats. Simul Gaming 46:255–269
Freeman S, Eddy SL, McDonough M, Smith MK, Okoroafor N, Jordt H, Wenderoth MP (2014) Active learning
increases student performance in science, engineering, andmathematics. Proc Natl Acad Sci 111(23):8410–8415
Gifford R (2011) The dragons of inaction: psychological barriers that limit climate change mitigation and
adaptation. Am Psychol 66:290–302
Gillis J (2017) Carbon in atmosphere is rising, even as emissions stabilize. The New York Times
Gilovich T, Savitsky K (2002) Like goes with like: the role of representativeness in erroneous and pseudo-
scientific beliefs
Goodwin P, Katavouta A, Roussenov VM et al (2018) Pathways to 1.5 °C and 2 °C warming based on
observational and geological constraints. Nat Geosci 11:102–107
Guy S, Kashima Y, Walker I, O’Neill S (2013) Comparing the atmosphere to a bathtub: effectiveness of analogy
for reasoning about accumulation. Clim Chang 121:579–594
Guy S, Kashima Y, Walker I, O’Neill S (2014) Investigating the effects of knowledge and ideology on climate
change beliefs. Eur J Soc Psychol 44:421–429
Hamilton LC, Hartter J, Saito K (2015) Trust in scientists on climate change and vaccines. SAGE Open 5(3)
Hornsey MJ, Harris EA, Bain PG, Fielding KS (2016) Meta-analyses of the determinants and outcomes of belief
in climate change. Nat Clim Chang 6:622
Houghton JT, Ding Y, Griggs DJ et al (2001) Climate change 2001: the scientific basis. The Press Syndicate of
the University of Cambridge
JonesN, RossH, LynamTet al (2011)Mental models: an interdisciplinary synthesis of theory andmethods. Ecol Soc 16
Kahneman D, Frederick S (2002) Representativeness revisited: attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. In:
Heuristics and biases: the psychology of intuitive judgment, pp 49:49–49:81
Korzilius H, Raaijmakers S, Rouwette E, Vennix J (2014) Thinking aloud while solving a stock-flow task:
surfacing the correlation heuristic and other reasoning patterns. Syst Res Behav Sci 31(2):268–279
Meinshausen M, Smith SJ, Calvin K et al (2011) The RCP greenhouse gas concentrations and their extensions
from 1765 to 2300. Clim Chang 109:213–241
Morgan MG, Fischhoff B, Bostrom A, Atman CJ (2002) Risk communication: a mental models approach.
Cambridge University Press
Moxnes E, Saysel AK (2009) Misperceptions of global climate change: information policies. Clim Chang
93:15–37
Newell BR, Kary A, Moore C, Gonzalez C (2013) Managing our debt: changing context reduces misunder-
standing of global warming. In: 35th annual meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (CogSci 2013). pp
3139–3144
Newell BR, Kary A, Moore C, Gonzalez C (2016) Managing the budget: stock-flow reasoning and the CO2
accumulation problem. Top Cogn Sci 8:138–159
Pérez-Reverte A (1998) The Club Dumas. Vintage International, New York
Peters GP, Andrew RM, Boden T et al (2012) The challenge to keep global warming below 2 °C. Nat Clim
Chang 3:4–6
Podolefsky NS, Finkelstein ND (2006) Use of analogy in learning physics: the role of representations. Physical
Review Special Topics-Physics Education Research 2(2):020101
Ranney MA, Clark D (2016) Climate change conceptual change: scientific information can transform attitudes.
Top Cogn Sci 8:49–75
Redish EF (2003) Teaching physics with the physics suite. Wiley, Hoboken
Reichert C, Cervato C, Niederhauser D, Larsen MD (2015) Understanding atmospheric carbon budgets: teaching
students conservation of mass. J Geosci Educ 63:222–232
Savelsbergh ER, De Jong T, Ferguson-Hessler MG (2002) Situational knowledge in physics: the case of
electrodynamics. J Res Sci Teach 39(10):928–951
66 Climatic Change (2019) 154:49–67
Shi J, Visschers VH, Siegrist M, Arvai J (2016) Knowledge as a driver of public perceptions about climate
change reassessed. Nat Clim Chang 6:759
Sterman JD (2008) Risk communication on climate: mental models and mass balance. Science 322:532–533
Sterman JD (2011) Communicating climate change risks in a skeptical world. Clim Chang 108:811
Sterman JD, Booth Sweeney L (2002) Cloudy skies: assessing public understanding of global warming. Syst
Dyn Rev 18:207–240
Sterman JD, Booth Sweeney L (2007) Understanding public complacency about climate change: adults’ mental
models of climate change violate conservation of matter. Clim Chang 80:213–238
Sterner EO, Johansson DJ (2017) The effect of climate–carbon cycle feedbacks on emission metrics. Environ Res
Lett 12:034019
Turns SR, Van Meter PN (2011) Applying knowledge from educational psychology and cognitive science to a
first course in thermodynamics. In: ASEE annual conference and exposition, conference proceedings
Wibeck V (2014) Enhancing learning, communication and public engagement about climate change – some
lessons from recent literature. Environ Educ Res 20:387–411
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.
Affiliations
Erik O. Sterner1 & Tom Adawi2 & U. Martin Persson1 & Ulrika Lundqvist1
Tom Adawi
tom.adawi@chalmers.se
U. Martin Persson
martin.persson@chalmers.se
Ulrika Lundqvist
ulrika.lundqvist@chalmers.se
1 Department Space, Earth and Environment, Chalmers University of Technology,
412 96 Gothenburg, Sweden
2 Department Communication and Learning in Science, Chalmers University of Technology,
412 96 Gothenburg, Sweden
Climatic Change (2019) 154:49–67 67
